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Abstract
In this article I take an unusual starting point from which to argue for a unified cognit-
ive science, namely a position defined by what is sometimes called the ‘life-mind con-
tinuity thesis’. Accordingly, rather than taking a  widely accepted starting point for 
granted and using it in order to propose answers to some well defined questions, 
I must first establish that the idea of life-mind continuity can amount to a proper start-
ing point at all. To begin with, I therefore assess the conceptual tools which are avail-
able to construct a theory of mind on this basis. By drawing on insights from a variety 
of disciplines, especially from a combination of existential phenomenology and or-
ganism-centered biology, I argue that mind can indeed be conceived as rooted in life, 
but only if we accept at the same time that social interaction plays a constitutive role 
for our cognitive capacities.
Introduction
The computational theory of mind is surely one of the biggest scientific success stor-
ies of the 20
th century. It first emerged against the backdrop of a behaviorist estab-
lishment that rejected all study of the inner workings of the mind as unscientific, and 
yet it managed to convincingly demonstrate that the opposite was in fact the case. 
Computationalism made it conceivable for the first time that mental phenomena are 
a potential target for modern scientific study. In addition, it showed that it is possible 
to   develop   a  systematic   research   program   by   bringing   together   a  variety   of 
disciplines under one shared hypothesis, in this case the idea that cognition is a form 
of computation. The trick was to conceive of the burgeoning field of computer 
technology not merely as a means for cognitive science, but as a target for study in 
its own right as well. Far from being vague and unscientific, the computational theory 114 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
of mind had the advantage over previous theories in psychology of being securely 
founded on the formal principles of artificial intelligence.
However, as soon as the idea that the mind is indeed a valid target for serious scien-
tific study had become more widely accepted, voices of dissent against the founda-
tions of the computational theory of mind began to make themselves heard. Starting 
with Dreyfus’ attack on symbolic AI in the ‘70s, followed by the connectionist move-
ment of the ‘80s, and then continuing with the dynamical and situated robotics ap-
proach of the ‘90s, the originally narrow scope of cognitive science has continually 
been expanded. Today we are in a situation where numerous alternative approaches 
to computationalist cognitive science are clamoring for attention, and it is not uncom-
mon for researchers to combine them into a loosely knit framework. In fact, even 
among some of the functionalists it has become fashionable to describe cognition as 
being embodied, embedded, extended and enactive. On my view, however, it is the 
enactive approach, in the sense in which it was conceived by Francisco Varela and 
colleagues
1, that pushes these developments to their logical conclusion, namely by 
treating mind as fundamentally inseparable from the existence of our subjective ex-
perience, its biological embodiment and its situatedness in the socio-cultural world.
Nevertheless, we should not forget that it is also thanks to the history of computation-
alist cognitive science that we now know much more precisely how the mind is funda-
mentally not like a computer. Take my laptop for instance: it can process inputs, store 
information and calculate the next outputs, and yet these events have absolutely no 
meaning for it. To put it simply, it does not understand anything at all, nor can it even 
care about this lack of understanding. In philosophy of mind and cognitive science 
this foundational issue makes an appearance every now and again. Today it contin-
ues to be debated under various related guises, e.g. the common sense problem, the 
symbol grounding problem, the frame problem, the hard problem of consciousness, 
and, most generally perhaps, the problem of meaning. But if it weren’t for the failure 
of computationalist cognitive science to account for this aspect of mind, we would 
never have had such a clear understanding of how it is an essential part of our exist-
ence in the first place.
To be sure, it may be possible that this pervasive problem of how to explain meaning 
can eventually be solved by using the right kind of computational algorithms, for ex-
ample by some form of ‘meta-cognition’. Yet at the same time it is also an exciting 
possibility, as indicated by the growing popularity of alternative approaches to cognit-
ive science, that a much more fundamental change in perspective is needed to ad-
vance on this issue. In the rest of this article I want to sketch the outlines of what 
such a change might look like. 
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Step 1: Solving the mind-body problem
The successful establishment of the field of cognitive science depended to a large 
extent on the field’s ability to unite psychology and neuroscience under the umbrella 
framework of computer science. One of the main contributions of this constellation of 
disciplines is that it offers a scientifically workable solution to the mind-body problem: 
the personal / sub-personal distinction is conceived in terms of a software / hardware 
distinction. 
In order for an alternative approach to cognitive science to be a serious contender for 
a new unifying theory of mind, it must also be able to address the mind-body problem 
in a satisfactory manner. Interestingly, there is a growing realization in the enactive 
approach that the mind-body problem is both more complex and simpler than has tra-
ditionally been supposed. First, it is important to acknowledge that on the so-called 
‘personal level’ we can actually distinguish between several different perspectives, 
most crucially between the first-person (subjective experience), the second-person 
(dialogical I-You interaction), and the third-person (objective measurement) perspec-
tive
2. 
Furthermore, so far cognitive science has always been working with a simple binary 
distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes (i.e. the ‘cognitive 
unconscious’). But careful phenomenological and psychoanalytical research reveals 
that we need to consider at least a tertiary distinction on the psychological level of 
description, namely between reflective experience (transitive awareness), pre-reflec-
tive experience (intransitive awareness), and unconscious processes (no immediate 
awareness)
3. And, of course, there is also the physical level of description from the 
third-person perspective.
How does this more differentiated conception of human existence help us to solve 
the mind-body problem? The solution is centered on the pre-reflective level which 
had been previously hidden behind the absolutism of the mind-matter distinction. We 
may be able to spend significant parts of our existence in the reflective mode of the 
thinker, yet at the same time careful investigation of our experience shows that these 
moments are merely temporary excursions. Where do we exist the rest of the time? 
An answer developed by the phenomenological tradition, and taken up the enactive 
approach to cognitive science, is that we are always already practically engaged in 
our lives. This is the experiential realm filled with purposeful striving, temporal flows, 
ambiguous moods, sense-making, bodily feeling, and so forth. In a word, the phe-
nomenon of life refers to the constitution of our ‘lived’ (from the German word erlebte) 
existence, which is practically embodied and meaningfully situated in a world. 
2 See, e.g., Zahavi (2005), Petitmengin (2006) and Stawarska (2009).
3 See, e.g., Zahavi (2006), Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, Chapter 3) and Fuchs (in press). 116 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
At the same time we know that this experiential or phenomenological aspect of life 
does not give us the complete story. Modern science has come a long way to reveal 
the many intricate material processes at work in the living body. There are metabolic 
cycles, energy transfers, cycles of growth and decay, chemical synthesis, neural fir-
ings, and so forth. In other words, any modern understanding of the phenomenon of 
life also has to take into account the organization of our biological body. Here we are 
thus confronted with yet another variant of the famous mind-body problem. But notice 
that in this case there is at least the advantage of a sense of a conceptual unity: both 
phenomenology and biology are interested in the study of life. And more importantly, 
we know from direct experience that there is an ontological unity as well. To put it dif-
ferently, my living body does not only exist as an external object to biological science; 
I exist as this body. I experience that I am this living body during my practical engage-
ment with the world, as a scary trip to the doctor can easily reveal. 
This personal insight, which everyone can verify for themselves, informs one of the 
core tenets of the enactive approach, namely that the material manifestation of my 
body as a living body cannot be separated from the experiential manifestation of my 
body as a lived body. On this view, in contrast not only to the modern variants of 
Cartesian mind-body dualism but to other embodied approaches to cognitive science 
as well, the mind is not only embodied in a  living body;  the living body is also 
‘minded’ by a lived mind. This intertwining of biological life and mental life is perhaps 
the most radical implication of the life-mind continuity thesis.
An important step toward dissolving the traditional mind-body problem can therefore 
be accomplished by fine-tuning the conceptual and phenomenological lenses we use 
to study the problem. The absolute explanatory gap can be relativized by the phe-
nomenon of life into a ‘body-body problem’
4. To be sure, this refocusing can only be 
the very beginning of a new science of mind. What made early cognitive science so 
successful is that AI and computer science stepped up to the challenge and turned 
the philosophy of functionalism into a workable scientific research program in terms 
of the computational theory of mind. What could play a similar role in this case? It 
would seem that biology as the science of life would be naturally suited for this job, 
yet unfortunately this is not immediately so. While we are in need of a theory of the 
living body as such, i.e. a theory of the organism, it turns out that modern biology has 
largely been preoccupied with anything but the organism itself. On the one hand, it 
has focused on the study of sub-organismic processes, most notably related to ge-
netics, and on the other hand, it has focused on super-organismic processes, espe-
cially Darwinian evolution. Unfortunately, it seems that the development of a new sci-
ence of mind cannot be accomplished without the development of a new science of 
life as well.
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In order to fill this gap in modern biology we can draw on theories of the living organ-
ism as they have been developed in relation to cybernetics. One of the central ideas 
is that a living being can be conceived as an autopoietic system, which essentially 
means that it is a system that is organized so that one of the results of its operations 
is   the   continued   existence   of   that   system   itself
5.  The   classic   example   of   an 
autopoietic system is a single-cell organism: if it weren’t for the organized existence 
of the cell as a whole, the metabolic processes would not be able to continue and 
would quickly decay away. And at the same time, if the metabolic processes did not 
continue to operate, that would spell the end for the cell’s existence. 
We can find other instances of this co-dependency at several other biological levels 
of description. For example, we can think of the relationship between the cell’s meta-
bolic networks and its molecular components, whereby the networks are made out of 
the same components which their own activity produces. Another famous example is 
the co-dependency between the outer cell membrane and the inner metabolic net-
works, whereby the membrane regulates the necessary material and energetic ex-
changes and prevents the metabolic networks from diffusing and dissolving into the 
environment, while the metabolic networks produce the molecular components out of 
which the membrane is made. Other co-dependencies were added with the major 
transitions of evolution, but the essential idea remains the same in all cases. An or-
ganism is conceived as an autopoietic network of processes.
The concept of autopoiesis is a useful one with regard to the body-body problem for 
several reasons. First of all, it ensures that the concept of an organism is not merely 
used as a convenient label for what in the end is a reduction to the mere sum of its 
isolated parts. We can be certain that an organism exists in its own right, and not 
merely as a theoretician’s product, because when we distinguish it as an autopoietic 
system we find that it has an internal relation to its own identity. In other words, it is 
what it is because of what it does, and it does what it does because of what it is. An-
other way of putting this in systemic terms is to say that an organism can be concep-
tualized as an autonomous system, namely as a self-maintaining, and more import-
antly, self-producing – and therefore self-distinguishing – network of processes. 
Second, there are compelling reasons to assume that this internal relation of the or-
ganism serves as a reference point in relation to which internal and external events 
can show up as meaningful. Third, since the very existence of the organism is an on-
going achievement in the face of continuous decay and possible death, it is not too 
farfetched to argue that it is precisely this precarious situation which furnishes it with 
a perspective of concern. On this view, existential (metabolic) survival is regarded as 
the first of all values. Notice also that in this way we have left the functionalist frame-
5 See, e.g., Maturana and Varela (1987), Varela (1997), and Froese and Stewart (2010).118 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
work of traditional cognitive science behind us: death, as the cessation of all function, 
cannot itself be viewed as another function without falling into paradox
6.
What these considerations nicely illustrate is that it is possible to work from the living 
body toward the lived body, just like we examined the living body from the perspect-
ive of the lived body. Although they are not immediately the same, the two sides of 
the body-body problem are not utterly alien to each other, either. 
A further advantage of the autopoietic theory of the organism is that it is closely relat-
ed to the mathematics of dynamical systems theory, which is neutral with regard to 
the ontological status of the modeled phenomena. Both biological and phenomeno-
logical events unfold in time, and this temporal structure can serve as a formal bridge 
between the two. In this unifying potential dynamical systems theory plays a similar 
role for this alternative approach as computer science did for traditional cognitive sci-
ence. And yet there are several reasons for preferring the former: (i) dynamical sys-
tems theory provides a more general mathematical framework (even a computer is 
a kind of dynamical system, although of a peculiar discrete type), (ii) it allows us to do 
better justice to the continuous temporal changes of the phenomena at multiple 
timescales, and (iii) it is already the standard mathematical language of the natural 
sciences. In addition, and this is especially important in relation to cognitive science, 
it can prevent us from formulating explanations that are mistakenly over-psychologiz-
ing phenomena at inappropriate levels of description, such as the pre-reflective, 
metabolic or neural levels
7.
Step 2: Bridging the cognitive gap in theory
In the previous section I have introduced the ingredients for a unified cognitive sci-
ence, although the interdisciplinary constellation of this alternative approach is quite 
distinct from the traditional one. Instead of triangulating between cognitive psycholo-
gy, cognitive neuroscience, and computer science, it requires the development of 
new collaborations between existential phenomenology, organism-centered biology, 
and dynamical systems theory. On this view, Varela’s pioneering proposal of neuro-
phenomenology
8  is not sufficient; what is needed is a  comprehensive  bio-phe-
nomenology. 
Of course, the core disciplines of traditional cognitive science will continue to play an 
important role. Psychology is indispensable for good experimental design, neuros-
cience has the tools to investigate events at the sub-personal level, and computer 
science remains necessary for the practice of devising robotic or systemic models 
that serve as working proof of concepts. But while the methods of these disciplines 
6 See, e.g., Jonas (1966), Weber and Varela (2002), Thompson (2004), and Di Paolo (2009).
7 See, e.g., Port and van Gelder (eds.) (1995), Roy et al. (1999), and Lutz and Thompson (2003).
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continue to be relevant for the enactive approach, the way they are applied is given 
a different focus. 
Similarly, not every wheel needs to be reinvented. For instance, in the field of artificial 
life there is a long tradition of modeling autopoiesis and the dynamical systems study 
of minimal cognition has also been ongoing for a couple of decades
9. What the enac-
tive approach contributes to these existing traditions is to make the mutually inform-
ing links between their interests and those of other disciplines, whether they already 
are a part of cognitive science or not, more explicit. In my own work I have been es-
pecially interested in the way in which insights from existential phenomenology, or-
ganism-centered biology, and agent-based modeling can be put into a mutually en-
lightened relationship
10.
But given this new starting point for cognitive science we are immediately confronted 
by a profound challenge: in what way can the insights of the life-mind continuity the-
sis be made more relevant to the specific interests of traditional cognitive science? 
That is, how can the study of adaptive living in the case of simple organisms be 
scaled up to the study of abstract cognition in the case of human beings? I have la-
beled this scaling problem, in reference to the explanatory gap faced by the function-
alist thesis, the ‘cognitive gap’
11. However, I immediately hasten to emphasize that we 
are dealing with two fundamentally different kinds of gaps here: a gap of metaphysi-
cal proportions has been replaced by one of levels of complexity. All that needs to be 
done now is to demonstrate that the cognitive gap can be addressed in a systematic 
manner. In other words, while the cognitive gap of the life-mind continuity thesis 
refers to a coherent starting point which still requires further work, the explanatory 
gap of the mind-body problem refers to the lack of a starting point altogether. 
The fact that the cognitive gap can indeed be overcome has been demonstrated by 
nature on two time scales. In historical time there was of course the evolution of mod-
ern Homo sapiens from proto-cellular origins. Unfortunately, however, the immense 
scale of this historical life-mind continuity makes it difficult to use evolutionary princi-
ples in order to apply insights gained at the level of organismic life directly to the level 
of human cognition. a more promising route may be the life-mind continuity which we 
can witness within the more manageable scale of our lifetimes, namely the develop-
ment of a human being from its single-cell origins
12. 
Yet, as the ever present nature-nurture debate demonstrates, the phenomenon of 
cognitive development continues to be a deep scientific problem. We will not get into 
9 Beer (2003); McMullin (2004).
10 Froese and Ziemke (2009); Froese and Gallagher (2010). See also Rohde (2010).
11 Froese (2009); Froese and Di Paolo (2009); De Jaegher and Froese (2009).
12 An added advantage of this approach is that many developmental principles are readily expressed 
in the framework of dynamical systems theory (e.g. Thelen and Smith 1994; Smith and Thelen 
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the details of the nature-nurture dichotomy here
13. For our purposes it is sufficient to 
accept that in many cases it is indeed difficult if not impossible to conceive how an 
isolated  individual could learn complex behaviors without already being endowed 
with complex innate cognitive capacities (the most prominent example in traditional 
cognitive science being the case of language acquisition and the hypothesis of innate 
grammar). And yet at the same time we know that it is possible to enculturate non-
human apes such as bonobos and chimpanzees by raising them in our social con-
text
14. And we further know that when a young Homo sapiens happens to be deprived 
of an appropriate socio-cultural context, it will sadly fail to develop the advanced cog-
nitive capacities we have come to associate with the human species. In other words, 
it cannot be denied that specifically human cognition depends to a large extent on 
our involvement with others. If we want to bridge the cognitive gap we therefore need 
to take into account the role of sociality.
Traditional cognitive science has long recognized that a theory of the way in which 
we make sense of others is an important research goal. Right from the start comput-
er science has provided a workable conceptual framework in the form of information 
theory. This theory, communication is essentially conceived as the transfer of infor-
mation over a channel between a sender and a receiver, continues to be attractive to 
many since it fits neatly with the computational theory of mind. Indeed, the theory has 
been applied in many areas of cognitive science and has become the standard 
framework in mainstream biology. We will not enter into the debate about the validity 
of this theory here
15.
However, given the close relationship between the computational theory of mind and 
the information theory of communication, we can already expect that the latter will be 
faced by related problems. And indeed the field of social cognition in psychology has 
been haunted by an impasse analogous to the mind-body problem, namely the prob-
lem of other minds. This problem can be described as follows: given that the mind is 
distinct from the body, and given that we only receive the signals sent by the external 
bodies of others, then how do we ever come to know anything about the internal 
minds of others? For all we know, the computationalist cognitive scientists are forced 
to conclude, everyone else could be mindless zombies and we would never know the 
difference.
What this means in relation to the development of human cognition is that it is difficult 
to conceptualize how relations with others could be helpful unless the infant has 
already been innately provided with the cognitive tools to know (by theoretical infer-
ence and/or simulation) that the mindless automata moving around him could hypo-
13 See Oyama (2000).
14 Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1998).
15 But see, e.g., Maturana and Varela (1987, Chapter 8), Di Paolo (1997), and Shanker and King 
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thetically be intentional beings like himself. But the problem is that even if the infant 
was innately endowed with some of the best reasoning abilities, according to the the-
ory of the computationalists it would still be faced with the almost impossible task to 
unravel the meaning of what must look like entirely arbitrary sounds, sights and 
movements. 
These considerations are important for our current purpose because it is rather diffi-
cult to bridge the cognitive gap by appealing to social relations when our understand-
ing of the relations to others is confronted by the problem of other minds. In what fol-
lows we will therefore develop a solution to the problem of other minds, and this will 
be done in an analogous fashion to the dissolution of the mind-body problem. 
Step 3: Solving the problem of other minds
As noted before, careful phenomenological analysis reveals that the absolute distinc-
tion between the first-person perspective (experiencing myself as an ‘I’) and the third-
person perspective (experiencing the other as an ‘it’) must be rejected as inadequate. 
It simply neglects the fact that we can also encounter each other in the second-per-
son perspective (experiencing the other as a ‘you’). There are of course distressing 
pathological cases in which people have limited or no access to enter the second-
person perspective, such as in autism and schizophrenia. However, under ordinary 
circumstances we do not encounter the other merely as an ‘it’, although we can 
choose to do so as would perhaps a soldier who is aiming to kill his enemy or a sur-
geon who is operating on the body of his patient. 
But under everyday conditions, while interacting with others, I do not perceive my fel-
low human beings in terms of zombie-like bodies with the theoretical possibility of 
having a mind. On the contrary, I directly perceive that the others around me are liv-
ing-minded beings in their own right, and I perceive that they can perceive me in this 
way, too. This immediate perceptual realization of the other’s lived embodiment pre-
cedes any kind of theoretical reflection
16. 
There are two important consequences of this phenomenological analysis for our cur-
rent discussion. First, it follows that the major theories of social cognition have been 
confined to an overly narrow view of sociality. They have focused on cognitive mech-
anisms for the acquisition of reflective knowledge about others, while the possible 
role of direct pre-reflective intuition of others has been neglected. Yet when I meet 
someone I do not have to theoretically posit the possibility of my interlocutor’s mental 
existence; I immediately perceive the other’s lived presence in their gestures. This 
kind of direct perception has typically been described in terms of empathy or sym-
pathy in the phenomenological tradition. Note that once we acknowledge the exist-
ence of the pre-reflective second-person perspective there is no longer any problem 
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of other minds as such, at least not on the reflective level traditionally targeted by 
cognitive psychology. And this brings us to the second point, namely that we are now 
faced with the challenge to explain the basis for our pre-reflective understanding of 
others. 
One promising approach in this regard is to focus on the existence of a shared basis 
of understanding or a kind of common sense, literally speaking. Variations of this idea 
have been proposed by existential phenomenology, where it is typically described as 
the lack of an absolute ‘self’ and ‘other’ distinction during interaction at the pre-reflect-
ive level of the lived body. But these ideas have typically been expressed philosoph-
ically without any serious consideration of modern science. The traditional problem of 
other minds, on the other hand, is closely aligned to cognitive science, but is instead 
typically conceived in terms of how to explain the possibility of epistemic access 
between two metaphysically isolated minds. Fortunately, the life-mind continuity thes-
is opens up another promising option. If we accept the tenet that a living body is also 
a lived body, and if we can also show that interacting bodies become one body to 
some extent, then there is indeed a basis for directly sharing in each other’s minded-
ness. This is one of the central ideas of my work, which I will call the extended body 
hypothesis.
It is not too difficult to show that, in theoretical terms at least, a concept of the living 
organism centered on the notion of an autopoietic system can be extended in the re-
quired manner. In fact, there is currently much discussion in the enactive approach to 
cognitive science which focuses precisely on this issue
17. 
The first thing to emphasize is that a real autopoietic system cannot be thought in 
isolation from its environment. The membrane of a cell, for instance, preserves the 
cell not by simply isolating it, but rather by adaptively regulating environmental inter-
actions. Of course, the cell must keep itself distinct and safe from the aversive influ-
ences of its environment in order to survive. And yet at the same time it must be open 
enough to engage the environment in a flexible manner and to find the nutrients 
which it needs to support its metabolism. On this view, the cell and the environment 
are not two isolated systems, but are intrinsically related in an asymmetric way (with 
the former depending on the latter for its existence). The upshot of this is that life is 
not some kind of independent substance, but a relational process
18.
Furthermore, the environmental side of this relation is not limited to chemical ele-
ments alone, but can include other organisms as well. In the case of the cell it is quite 
possible that its metabolism directly depends on the products of other organisms. 
And if some of those organisms also depend on the cell’s excretions, then we have 
17 De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007); Froese and Di Paolo (2009); De Jaegher and Froese (2009). 
18 Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno (2004); Di Paolo (2005); Barandiaran and Moreno (2008); Barandiaran, et 
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established another cycle of co-dependency which relates these two organisms into 
a larger autonomous unit, an extended living body. In some cases this new autonomy 
can form a complex structural coherence so that we start speaking of multi-cellular 
organisms. The autopoietic theory of the organism can therefore be scaled up
19. As 
an   aside,   note   that   if   we   accept   that   a  living   body   and   a  lived   mind   are 
complementary phenomena, then here we have a partial response to the question of 
how we can be made out of individual living bodies (cells) and yet still experience the 
world from one unified perspective.
The metabolic formation of co-dependencies and multi-cellular organisms may serve 
as a general proof of concept for the extended body, but it does not help us directly 
with the task of finding a potential shared basis for our pre-reflective understanding of 
others. But can social interactions play a similar role perhaps? Again, organism-cen-
tered biology already has the basic theoretical resources we need. Rather than fo-
cusing on cycles of co-dependency in the chemical domain, such as autopoietic self-
production, we simply turn our attention to the autonomous cycles in the way in which 
organisms relate to their environment. In the case of animals, for instance, we find 
a clear example that what the animal does depends on what it senses, and that what 
it senses depends on what it does
20. 
And furthermore, given that a living body is also a minded body, each bodily move-
ment is complemented not only by a  change in sense perception, but also by 
a change in the lived body. Living, sensing, and doing are, through the mediation of 
the environment and the body, linked into one unified sensorimotor loop. On this 
view, the absolute distinction between perception, cognition, and action in traditional 
cognitive science (most famously expressed in the sense-model-plan-act framework) 
appears to be arbitrary. The enactive approach, more than any of the alternative ap-
proaches to cognitive science, has tried to do justice to the co-dependent nature of 
living, sensing and doing (and more generally of experiencing and moving) by em-
ploying the notion of sense-making in a literal way
21. 
Since sense-making is based on the organism’s sensorimotor loop and is therefore 
mediated through the environment, and the environment includes other organisms 
with their own sensorimotor loops, there is always the potential that there will be an 
interaction between the sense-making of distinct individuals. Moreover, it may hap-
pen that the organisms interact in a mutually responsive manner such that their sen-
sorimotor loops become extended into a larger autonomous cycle. In addition to the 
usual sense-making, one organism’s behavior leads to a change in the other organis-
19 Maturana and Varela (1987); Froese and Di Paolo (in press).
20 Out of all the ideas discussed in this article, the co-dependency between perception and action has 
been the most popular research topic among alternative approaches to cognitive science. See, 
e.g., Varela, et al. (1991); O’Regan and Noë (2001); Noë (2004; 2009); Barandiaran and Moreno 
(2006); Thompson (2005).
21 Weber and Varela (2002); Thompson (2004); Di Paolo (2005); Sheets-Johnstone (1999).124 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
m’s sensations thus resulting in a change of its behavior which in turn modifies the 
sensations of this first organism and its behavior, and so forth. When the two organ-
isms modulate each other’s sensorimotor loop in this manner, they of course also 
modulate each other’s sense-making activities. They are engaging in participatory 
sense-making
22.
The concept of participatory sense-making provides us with the theoretical founda-
tion we need in order to explain the basis of our pre-reflective understanding of oth-
ers. When our mutual interaction with others turns into an autonomous cycle in its 
own right, our bodies temporarily become one extended body via the dynamical me-
diation of our respective sensorimotor loops. And, once again, it is important to em-
phasize that according to the basic tenets of the life-mind continuity thesis an exten-
ded living body entails an extended lived body.  What this means is that in the 
second-person perspective, when our bodies become dynamically entangled, we can 
take part in each other’s experience. 
In sum, we have argued that when we become aware of how we experience others 
during our interactions with them, we notice that at least on this existential level there 
is no problem of other minds. I can directly perceive others as living-minded beings 
like myself, and I can see that they perceive my likewise, too. Moreover, it is possible 
to give a coherent explanation for the possibility of sharing experience with others in 
terms of the life-mind continuity thesis and the extended body hypothesis. 
Of course, what still needs to be explained is how the principles of participatory 
sense-making can be scaled up to account for the reflective levels of human social 
cognition, including the capacity for theorizing about other minds. But, more import-
antly, we have replaced yet another dilemma of metaphysical proportions by one of 
levels of complexity, and we are simply faced with a variation of the cognitive gap.
Step 4: Bridging the cognitive gap again, in practice
However, wasn’t this detour through the problem of other minds supposed to provide 
us with a solution to the cognitive gap by making our relations with others an intrinsic 
element in support of cognitive development? If relations with others are also limited 
by a cognitive gap, then it may seem that we have hit another dead end. 
But this worry underestimates the role played by pre-reflective second-person inter-
action in our relations with others, and it also underestimates the potential of the in-
teraction process to autonomously organize our individual abilities. We can avoid the 
dead end if it is possible to demonstrate that, during its mutual interaction with others, 
a young infant’s behavior can become appropriately entrained by the autonomous dy-
22 This notion was introduced by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) and has generated a lively discus-
sion in the enactive community, e.g. Steiner & Stewart (2009); Gallagher (2009); Torrance & Froese 
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namics of the interaction process, and its internal bodily organization can be spontan-
eously configured to further sustain the interaction in a more flexible and adaptive 
way. That is, we need to show that, as long as the infant has the ability to mutually at-
tune with others in the right kind of way, it can develop more advanced abilities 
through   its   interaction   with   others   relatively   automatically.  And   if   the   required 
sensitivity to others can also be achieved in the interaction itself, then the entire 
problem of the cognitive gap can be offloaded into a relational matrix distributed over 
self, others and the rest of the world.
Of course, it is one thing to show that this scenario is theoretically possible, and it is 
an entirely different thing to show that it is actually possible. In fact, given the major 
change in departure point which informs the scenario, an important first step will be 
to show that something like it is even possible in principle. This has motivated me to 
design a series of agent-based models of interaction which demonstrate that:  
- An individual’s sensitivity to others can result from interacting with others
- An individual’s movements can be structured through interacting with others
- An individual’s sensations can be structured through interacting with others
- An individual’s body can be structured through interacting with others
It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe these modeling results and their dy-
namical systems analysis in more detail here, and I have done so extensively else-
where
23. What is important for our current discussion is that these models are con-
crete proof of concepts that it is possible for the cognitive gap to be systematically 
addressed through the spontaneously enabling dynamics of social interaction. Of 
course, the next step will be to continue this initial research by conducting actual psy-
chological experiments, and some promising work in this direction is already under-
way
24.
Conclusion
All in all, the upshot of this article is that the computational theory of mind can indeed 
be replaced with an alternative framework centered on the notion of life-mind continu-
ity, but only by incorporating the constitutive role played by sociality. I have argued 
that this alternative approach to a unified cognitive science has compelling advant-
ages over other approaches. It is a workable scientific research program that stays 
23 The most detailed discussion so far can be found in my doctoral dissertation (Froese 2009), but 
some of the results can also be found in individual papers (e.g. Froese & Di Paolo 2008; 2010; in 
press-b).
24 Auvray, et al. (2009)126 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
clear of metaphysical conundrums, offers a closer alignment to human experience, 
and at the same time has sound mathematical foundations. 
References:
Auvray, M., Lenay, C. & Stewart, J. 2009. Perceptual interactions in a minimalist virtual environment. 
New Ideas in Psychology, 27(1): 32-47.
Barandiaran, X., Di Paolo, E. A. & Rohde, M. 2009. Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asym-
metry, and Spatio-temporality in Action, Adaptive Behavior, 17(5): 367-386. 
Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A. 2006. On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: a minimally 
cognitive organization program”, Adaptive Behavior, 14(2): 171-185.
Beer, R. D. 2003. The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent, Adaptive 
Behavior, 11(4): 209-243.
De Jaegher, H. & Di Paolo, E. A. 2007. Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social 
cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4): 485-507.
De Jaegher, H. & Froese, T. 2009. On the Role of Social Interaction in Individual Agency. Adaptive Be-
havior, 17(5): 444-460. 
Di Paolo, E. A. 1997. An investigation into the evolution of communication. Adaptive Behavior, 6(2): 
285-324.
Di Paolo, E. A. 2005. Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences, 4(4). 429-452.
Di Paolo, E. A. 2009. Extended life. Topoi, 28(1): 9-21.
Froese, T. 2009. Sociality and the life-mind continuity thesis: a study in evolutionary robotics. D.Phil. 
Thesis, Brighton, UK: University of Sussex.
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. 2008. Stability of coordination requires mutuality of interaction in a model 
of embodied agents: 52-61. Eds. Asada, M., Hallam, J. C. T., Meyer  J.-A. & Tani, J. From Animals 
to Animats 10: Proc. of the 10
th Int. Conf. on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior. Berlin, Germany: 
Springer-Verlag.
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. 2009. Sociality and the life-mind continuity thesis. Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 8(4): 439-463.
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (in press). The enactive approach: From cell to society.  Pragmatics 
& Cognition, forthcoming.
Froese, T. & Di Paolo, E. A. (in press-b). Toward Minimally Social Behavior: Social Psychology Meets 
Evolutionary Robotics. Advances in Artificial Life: Proc. of the 10
th Euro. Conf. on Artificial Life. 
Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.Tom Froese: Breathing new life into cognitive science 127
Froese, T. & Gallagher, S. 2010. Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supple-
mentation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Studies, 26(2): 83-106.
Froese, T. & Stewart, J. 2010. Life after Ashby: Ultrastability and the autopoietic foundations of biologi-
cal individuality. Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 17(4): 7-50.
Froese, T. & Ziemke, T. 2009. Enactive Artificial Intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of 
life and mind. Artificial Intelligence, 173(3-4): 366-500.
Fuchs, T. (in press). Body memory and the unconscious. Eds. Lohmar, D. & Brudzinska, J. Founding 
Psychoanalysis: Phenomenological Theory of Subjectivity and the Psychoanalytical Experience. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Gallagher, S. 2008. Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 
17(2): 535-543.
Gallagher, S. 2009. Two problems of intersubjectivity: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(6-8): 289-
308.
Gallagher, S. & Zahavi, D. 2008. The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind 
and Cognitive Science. London, UK: Routledge.
Hanna, R. & Thompson, E. 2003. The Mind-Body-Body Problem. Theoria et Historia Scientarum, 7(1): 
24-44.
Jonas, H. 1966 [2001]. The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press.
Lutz, A. & Thompson, E. 2003. Neurophenomenology: integrating subjective experience and brain dy-
namics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10: 31-52.
Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Noë, A. 2009. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of 
Consciousness. New York, NY: Hill and Wang.
O’Regan, J.K. & Noë, A. 2001. a sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 24(5): 939-1031.
Oyama, S. 2000. The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution. 2
nd edition. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Petitmengin, C. 2006. Describing one’s subjective experience in the second person: An interview 
method for the science of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences¸ 5(3-4): 
229-269.
Port, R. F. & van Gelder, T. Eds. 1995. Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 128 AVANT  Volume II, Number 1/2011   www.avant.edu.pl
Rohde, M. 2010. Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cogni-
tivist Science of Mind. Atlantis Press.
Roy, J.-M., Petitot, J., Pachoud, B. & Varela, F. J. 1999. Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturaliz-
ing Phenomenology: 1-80. Eds. Petitot, J., Varela, F. J., Pachoud, B. & Roy, J.-M. Naturalizing 
Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Ruiz-Mirazo, K. & Moreno, A. 2004. Basic Autonomy as a Fundamental Step in the Synthesis of Life. 
Artificial Life, 10(3): 235-259.
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Shanker, S. G. & Taylor, T. J. 1998. Apes, Language, and the Human Mind. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Shanker, S. G. & King, B. J. 2002. The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research. Be-
havioral and Brain Sciences, 25(5): 605-620.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. 1999. The Primacy of Movement. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Smith, L. & Thelen, E. 2003. Development as a dynamical system. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(8): 
343-348.
Stanghellini, G. 2004. Disembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies: The psychopathology of common 
sense. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Stawarska, B. 2009. Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology. Athens: Ohio University Press.
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E. A. Eds. 2010. Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cogni-
tive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Thelen, E. & Smith, L. B. 1994. a dynamical systems approach to the development of cognition and 
action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Thompson, E. 2004. Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. a tribute to Francisco 
Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 3(4): 381-398.
Thompson,   E.   2005.   Sensorimotor   subjectivity   and   the   enactive   approach   to   experience. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4): 407-427.
Thompson, E. 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Torrance, S. & Froese, T. 2011. An inter-enactive approach to agency: Participatory sense-making, dy-
namics, and sociality. Humana.Mente, 15: 21-53.
Maturana, H.R., & Varela, F. J. 1987. The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Under-
standing. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications.
McMullin, B. 2004. Thirty Years of Computational Autopoiesis: a Review. Artificial Life, 10(3): 277-295.Tom Froese: Breathing new life into cognitive science 129
Varela, F. J. 1996. Neurophenomenology: a Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 3(4): 330-349.
Varela, F. J. 1997. Patterns of Life: Intertwining Identity and Cognition. Brain and Cognition, 34(1): 72-
87.
Varela, F. J, Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Ex-
perience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Virgo, N., Egbert, M. & Froese, T. (forthcoming). The Role of the Spatial Boundary in Autopoiesis. 
Proc. of the 10th Euro. Conf. on Artificial Life. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.
Weber, A. & Varela, F. J. 2002. Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of 
biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1: 97-125.
Zahavi, D. 2001. Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies, 8(5-7): 151-167.
Zahavi, D. 2005. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press.
Zahavi, D. 2006. Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche, 12(2): 1-9.